

Taking OpenSSL into PKCS #11 World

and Vice Versa

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- Principal Software Engineer, Red Hat
- OpenSC developer and maintainer
 - Open source smart card tools and middleware
- Contributed and improved PKCS #11 support in different projects
 - OpenSSH, libssh, curl, p11-kit, rust-cryptoki, clevis, GnuTLS, ...
- PKCS #11 provider and kryoptic developer
 - Disclaimer: Most of the work done by Simo Sorce



- ▶ PKCS #11
- ▶ What's new in PKCS #11 3.2
- ▶ OpenSSL and PKCS #11
- ▶ pkcs11-provider
- ▶ kryoptic



PKCS #11

Cryptographic token
interface



PKCS #11: Cryptographic token interface

Cryptoki [crypto key]



Hardware Security Modules and Smart cards

Security: Segregation of cryptographic material

Store Cryptographic information

Execute cryptographic operations


Object-based approach

Technology independence

C API



Vocabulary



- ▶ **Module** – software implementing PKCS #11 API
 - GetFunctionList, GetInterfaceList, GetInterface
- ▶ **Slot + Token:** Logical or physical (smart cards)
 - Provide mechanisms and objects, authentication
- ▶ **Objects:** provide attributes: Keys, Certificates, Data ...
- ▶ **Operations:**
 - Take Objects, Mechanism and Parameters
 - Result in data or other objects



What's new in PKCS #11 3.2



Post-Quantum Cryptography

- ▶ PQC objects:
 - ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
- ▶ PQC Mechanisms
- ▶ New API to support PQC operations
 - C_EncapsulateKey(), C_DecapsulateKey()
 - C_VerifySignature*()



Validation API

FIPS service indicators

- ▶ Propagation of FIPS validation of HW to user
- ▶ Token validation information
 - CKO_VALIDATION object class
- ▶ Object validation flags
 - CKA_OBJECT_VALIDATION flag
- ▶ Operation validation status (= FIPS Service Indicators)
 - C_GetSessionValidationFlags()



Trust objects

Fine grained trust store

- ▶ New object class: CKO_TRUST
 - Maps to existing certificate object
- ▶ Different levels of trust/distrust
- ▶ For different usage (client, server, code signing, mail, ipsec ...)
- ▶ Who likes dealing OpenSSL's CA bundles?



How to use PKCS #11

- ▶ Follow the best practices
- ▶ Different implementations have different bugs
- ▶ A lot of boilerplate needed
 - Initialization, Slot/Token enumeration, Session management, Object enumeration, management and conversion, locking, synchronization
- ▶ -> Use OpenSSL pkcs11-provider



PKCS #11 and OpenSSL

Comparison
Relationship
History



Comparison

PKCS #11

x

OpenSSL 3.x

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|------------------------|
| ▶ C-API: simple Low-Level | x | C-API: rich High Level |
| ▶ Stable, backward compatible | x | Evolving |
| ▶ Slot/Token centric | x | Object centric |
| ▶ Object Attributes | x | Object OSSL_PARAMs |
| ▶ Many implementations | x | Many users |
| ▶ Custom implementations | x | Engines/Providers |



PKCS #11 + OpenSSL

The use case

- ▶ Familiar high-level OpenSSL API
- ▶ Vendors implementing standard PKCS #11 API for HW
- ▶ Developers interested in protecting private keys
- ▶ Security through separation
 - Break through OpenSSL API: possible
 - Break through OpenSSL, Providers and PKCS #11: ?
 - PKCS#11 is designed to prevent export of private key material



History

- ▶ engine_pkcs11 since 2005 (merged into libp11 in 2016)
 - Cumbersome, poor testing and architecture
 - Using engine specific API to load objects
- ▶ pks11-provider since 2022
 - Transparent usage with STORE API and PKCS #11 URI
 - SKEY API (Dmitry Belyavskiy later today)
 - PQC mechanisms



pkcs11-provider

A PKCS #11 provider for
OpenSSL 3.0+



OpenSSL pkcs11-provider

- ▶ Allow applications using OpenSSL to access cryptographic keys and operations on them
- ▶ Registers `pkcs11` : URI (RFC 7512) scheme in OpenSSL store
 - Avoids the PKCS#11 token centric approach
 - Returns familiar `EVP_PKEY` objects
 - The rest of operations same
- ▶ Until the user/malware tries to access/export private key material
 - Pkcs11 provider nor the pkcs11 module have access to that!



Challenges

Interfaces

- ▶ Provider API was undocumented, full of tables
 - Many macros, auto-generated code
- ▶ PKCS#11 API requires a lot of boilerplate
 - Generated code
- ▶ Recursion: pkcs11 provider in openssl.cnf
 - What if the pkcs11 module is using OpenSSL?
 - SoftHSM crashed or deadlocked because of poor use of libctx



Challenges

Early/late initialization

- ▶ PKCS#11 initialization is expensive – talks to HW
- ▶ What mechanisms we provide when OpenSSL asks?
 - Delay for the first use
- ▶ Configuration option `pkcs11-module-load-behavior` = early



Challenges

PKCS #11 implementation bugs

- ▶ Software has bugs
- ▶ Blocklist functionality with configuration
 - pkcs11-module-quirks = no-operation-state
 - Get/SetOperationState unusable
- ▶ Block class of operations
 - pkcs11-module-block-operations = digest, decoder ...
- ▶ Prevent PIN locking by repeated attempts
 - Cache PIN digest



Testing pkcs11-provider

- ▶ The PKCS #11 3.2 specification: almost 500 pages!
- ▶ Implementations have bugs
 - All, tokens, pkcs11-provider and OpenSSL
- ▶ CI with 3 different software tokens
- ▶ Integration tests with different applications: httpd, bind, libssh
- ▶ Test coverage for all new algorithms
- ▶ Part of OpenSSL CI (external tests)



What's next?

Future work

- ▶ PKCS #11 3.2
 - SLH-DSA
 - FIPS status propagation from token:
 - `pkcs11-module-assume-fips = yes`
 - Trust Objects integration: Provide a Trust store to OpenSSL
- ▶ Extend the Symmetric Keys support (Dmitry Belyavskiy later today)
 - ML-KEM, derivation ...

▶



kryptic



A PKCS #11 software
token written in Rust
using OpenSSL



What is kryptic?

- ▶ Software PKCS #11 implementation
 - using OpenSSL for cryptographic algorithm implementation
- ▶ Access OpenSSL primitives through a PKCS #11 API
- ▶ Written in rust
- ▶ All modern algorithms (including PQC)
- ▶ Useful (not only) for testing pkcs11-provider
- ▶ Side product: ossl crate: lightweight OpenSSL 3 native bindings



Why rust?

Its cool!

- ▶ Memory safety:
 - Bounds checks, thread safety at build time
 - Automatic memory management, but no GC
 - No runtime performance penalties
- ▶ Easy interfacing with C code
- ▶ A lot of refactorors
 - Helpful compiler makes it safe
- ▶ Steep learning curve



Interfacing C code from Rust

Memory safety limits



- ▶ PKCS #11: FFI from application to Rust code
 - Convert inputs using `unsafe { }`
 - `bindgen` crate
- ▶ Kryoptic: Token functionality: slots, sessions, mechanisms, locking, threading and more
- ▶ FFI from Rust to OpenSSL's code
 - Call functions using `unsafe { }`
 - `ossl` crate



OpenSSL inside of OpenSSL

For all the operations!



- ▶ Configure openssl.cnf with propq to use pkcs11 provider:
-propquery="?provider=pkcs11"
- ▶ Configure pkcs11 provider to use kryptic
- ▶ Offload the cryptographic operation from OpenSSL to OpenSSL
 - Test coverage



Kryptic as a FIPS module

Two-headed monster

- ▶ Kryptic can be statically linked with OpenSSL libfips.a
 - Few OpenSSL API tweaks
- ▶ Single static FIPS library with 2 APIs
 - Provider API: Usable in OpenSSL
 - PKCS #11: usable in NSS, GnuTLS, ...



Challenges

- ▶ PKCS #11 allows a lot of flexibility in some mechanisms
 - NIST SP800-108 KBKDF – IV lengths, odd combinations
- ▶ Static linking with FIPS provider
 - Different API for DigestSign API
 - Manual invocation of constructors, callbacks, tables
- ▶ Memory safety ends on FFI (**unsafe {}**)
 - Rust can not guarantee what happens behind that
 - OpenSSL API expectations regarding the buffer bounds
 - test coverage needed



Summary



PKCS #11: an API to access HSM and smart cards

The latest release PKCS #11 3.2 comes with PQC

Use pkcs11-provider to do so through OpenSSL

Testing? Replace the HW with kryoptic

New project? Use rust! We have openssl bindings!



Thank you

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