



Red Hat's Path to PQC with OpenSSL

Clemens Lang
RHEL Crypto Team Product Owner




CNSA 2.0 Timeline



What we'll cover today

- ▶ Timelines vs. RHEL release cycle
- ▶ PQC in RHEL 10.0 & CentOS 10 Stream
- ▶ PQC signatures over RPM packages
- ▶ PQC and FIPS
- ▶ PQC in OpenSSL via PKCS#11




Sources:

https://access.redhat.com/support/policy/updates/errata#RHEL10_Planning_Guide

PQC Tech Preview

RHEL 10.0, non-default



Quantum-oriented Update to Browsers
and Infrastructure for the PQ Transition

Enabling

```
# dnf install crypto-policies-pq-preview  
# update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT:TEST-PQ
```

Result

- hybrid key exchange in TLS
- pure ML-DSA

Under the hood

OpenSSL 3.2.2

oqsprovider 0.8.0 with liboqs 0.12.0

**OpenSSL win:
Providers**


```
[root@rhel-10-0 ~]# openssl s_client \  
-CAfile CA.crt \  
-connect test.openquantumsafe.org:6217 </dev/null \  
|& grep -A1 'Peer signature type'
```

Peer signature type: **mldsa87**

Negotiated TLS1.3 group: **X25519MLKEM768**

CentOS 10 Stream: PQC **by Default**



- ▶ OpenSSL 3.5.1, PQC by default
- ▶ We're testing for
 - PQC in TLS key exchange
 - Self-signed pure ML-DSA certs
 - Dual stack certs RSA/ML-DSA
- ▶ Code written against oqsprovider in 10.0 works

*OpenSSL win:
Compatibility*

Sources:

<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/26326>


<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26853>

<https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/openssl/-/commit/98cf25a4c0d4b9fa03944c92a8d366621250985e>

<https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/crypto-policies/-/commit/20e322ef5720fa51b6056dae87f5b2b18a406854>

Post-Quantum RPM Signatures

Using OpenSSL's primitives



- IETF WG is adding PQC to OpenPGP
- GnuPG unlikely to implement RFC 9580
- RPM transitioned to Sequoia-PGP
- Sequoia-PGP is adding PQC support with OpenSSL as backend

**OpenSSL win:
Reusability**

Post-Quantum Crypto and FIPS

An unresolvable dilemma?

- ▶ OpenSSL's FIPS provider allows continued use of older certified module
- ▶ Customers that need FIPS also the ones shouting loudest for PQC 😊
- ▶ FIPS certification takes years due to backlog
- ▶ Hybrids can be a stopgap measure
- ▶ NIST SP 800-227 Section 4.6 approves hybrid constructions
 - Secp256r1MLKEM768: Usable now with validated secp256r1
 - X25519MLKEM768: Usable in the future with validated ML-KEM

OpenSSL win:
Providers

PQC Hardware Tokens

PKCS#11 3.2

OpenSSL win:
Providers

Why PKCS#11?

Software Signing Keys in HSMs

HSMs typically support PKCS#11

PKCS#11 PQC Standardization

PKCS#11 version 3.2 adds PQC support

pkcs11-provider

Red Hat's pkcs11-provider supports ML-DSA through PKCS#11 3.2 in version 1.1

Red Hat + OpenSSL = PQC

Rapid Prototyping to Full Support

- oqsprovider in 10.0
- OpenSSL 3.5 in CentOS 10 Stream

Hybrids for FIPS Needs

- SP 800-227 enables hybrid key exchange in TLS

Reuse in Other Protocols

- RPM signatures using Sequoia-PGP
- Uses PQC from OpenSSL 3.5

Hardware Security Modules

- pkcs11-provider allows using PQC from HSMs in OpenSSL
- Interesting for Software Signing

Thank you! Questions?

I would appreciate feedback.



What's next in your org's PQ
transition?



 @neverpanic@chaos.social